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Introduction1 
In a series of methodologically oriented papers, Herbert Simon (e.g., 1976, 1978, 
1979) tried to convince economists to take seriously his Grand Theme of bounded 
rationality (henceforth, “BR”).  His examples of bounded rationality and its 
implications quite often involved the business firm. Indeed, he sometimes took the 
notion of “administrative man” to be synonymous with a boundedly rational agent.  
Of course, Simon himself published prolifically on firms and other organizations 
(e.g., Simon, 1949, 1951, 1991; March and Simon, 1958).  Given all this, it is 
surprising that  so I shall argue  economists of organization have made little 
use of the notion of BR, and that the arguably most successful contemporary 
economics research that explicitly builds on BR takes place in fields such as 
behavioral finance and behavioral law and economics.  In the following, I argue 
that BR is, in contrast to the impression often conveyed (e.g., by Augier, Kreiner 
and March, 2000), not used in an essential way in the modern economics of 
organization; it is very much a background assumption that is introduced to help 
explaining other, more central, insights and concepts (e.g., contractual 
incompleteness and organizational routines).  I then discuss the possible reasons 
for this, centering on 1) Simon’s influence and in particular the fact that he never 
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put forward a precise, affirmative program for research in BR in the context of 
economic organization, and 2) the difficulty of modeling BR in a way that is “loyal” 
to the economic mainstream. I finally discuss the role of BR in future work on 
economic organization.   
 
The Limited Use of Bounded Rationality in                                             
the Economics of Organization2 
Although the economics of organization may have been one of the first areas where 
the notion of bounded rationality was systematically applied in theorizing, later 
developments do not seem to have gone significantly beyond Simon (1951), Cyert 
and March (1963), Marschak and Radner (1972) and Williamson (1975).3  If 
anything, the use, or at least invocation, of the notion of bounded rationality 
appears to have declined, as theorists have discovered that asymmetric information 
(a precise concept) can often do the job that they intended BR (an imprecise 
concept) to do for them.   Moreover, at least some parts of the economics of 
organization  particularly contract theory (Hart, 1990) have developed into a 
highly formal and axiomatic enterprise, and BR is notoriously hard to formalize to 
the satisfaction of high theorists.. Even in the case of transaction cost economics BR 
enters in a loose background sort of way, in which it lends credence to 
exogeneously imposing constraints on the feasible contracting space, but is not 
modeled itself.4 In fact, we are never given precise definitions of what BR is in 
contract theory and transaction cost economics  
 The role of BR in these approaches is to supply the rhetorical function of 
lending intuitive support to the notion of incomplete contracts.  A Simonian 
information processing argument is sometimes loosely invoked in this connection.  
Thus, if agents do not have the mental capacity to think through the whole decision 
                                                          
2 This section reproduces arguments in Foss (2001a,b). 
3 The economics of organization is here defined broadly to include not only contract theory, team theory and 
transaction cost economics, but also the capabilities approach. 
4 It is true that Williamson (1975) and others who use BR invoke BR when addressing some aspects of 
organizational design (notably the M-form structure), but here, too, boundedly rational behavior itself is not 
really modeled. 
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tree  for example, in complicated bilateral trading relations , it seems 
reasonable to assume that some of the branches of the tree (such as those relating to 
some future uses of assets) cannot be represented in a contract; the contract is left 
incomplete. Still, agents are supposed to deal with this manifestation of bounded 
rationality in a substantively rational manner, as many critics have pointed out.  
However, recent debate (summarized in Tirole, 1999) seems to indicate that this is a 
problematic approach.  The reason is that if agents can indeed foresee payoffs from 
their relation they will, under conventional assumptions, be able to implement 
exactly the same allocations under incomplete as under complete contracts.  
Transaction costs, which are partly caused by BR, do not make any allocative 
difference. Per implication it is unclear what is the added explanatory content of 
theories that make use of incomplete contracts (and at least rhetorically, BR).   
 The organizational capabilities approach is often seen as making more explicit 
use of BR.  However, upon examination, it turns out that individual boundedly 
rational behavior is usually suppressed, because most of the attention is focused 
upon aggregate entities such as routines or capabilities. For example, Nelson and 
Winter (1982) do mention and discuss bounded rationality to the extent that this 
helps them introducing the behavioralist notion of decision rules.  Clearly such 
decision rules may be analyzed as manifestations of bounded rationality.  
However, agent level decision rules say nothing in themselves about organizational 
behavior.  What permits the link to be established is using the metaphor of 
individual skill on the level of the organization.  However, a consequence of this is 
that individual bounded rationality becomes suppressed. For example, it is not 
clear in principle whether organization-level routinization is produced by 
interaction effects among the members of a team or whether it is ultimately 
founded in aspects of individual cognition.  In other words, there is no clearly 
identified mechanism that aggregates from individual behavior to routines and 
organizational behavior. Thus, here too, bounded rationality is a sort of 
background argument that  in combination with other assumptions about tacit 
knowledge and skilled human behavior  serves to make plausible the notion of 
organizational routine (including search routines), and therefore the sluggish 
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organizational adaptation that is crucial in Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary story.  
In fact, it is the concept of routine, rather than individual bounded rationality that 
is centerstage in their discussion. Later contributors to this stream of thought have 
similarly focused attention on capabilities, competencies, and the like and have 
downplayed individual boundedly rational behavior. 
 One possible conclusion on the above is that there is  quite some distance 
between the rhetorics and practice concerning BR in the economics of organization.  
Organizational economists of all stripes often invoke BR, but they make precious 
little substantive use of it.  The reason why this is so is discussed next . 
 
 Why is Bounded Rationality Much Cited but Little Used  
in Organizational Economics?    
No doubt many contributors to the economics of organization feel that there is 
something obviously correct about the notion of BR, particularly in its vaguer 
forms, such as that man is “intendedly rational but only limitedly so.” Using the 
concept also helps establishing at least a rhetorical bridge to the organizational 
theory and behavior literatures, something which may be particularly attractive for 
those organizational economists that are employed by business schools.  This may 
explain the prevalence of references to BR in the organizational economics 
literature. However, as argued earlier, BR is not used in any substantive manner in 
the economics of organization.  There seem to me to be two dominant reasons for 
this, one historical, having to do with Simon’s influence on economists’ thinking on 
BR, and one having to do with the difficulty of aligning BR with the basic 
machinery of neoclassical microeconomics and game theory.  The reasons are 
related, for it is exactly because Simon only developed the rudiments of a positive 
program for research in BR in the context of the theory of the firm that economists 
have been able to 1) work with very watered down-versions of BR (and still claim 
these to be consistent with Simon’s vision) and 2) integrate these versions into an 
otherwise entirely mainstream theoretical structure.   
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 There can be little doubt that Simon has had a quite overwhelming influence 
on those economists who have taken an interest in firms and organization.  Because 
Simon is a towering figure not only with respect to developing the notion of BR, 
but also with respect to applying this notion in organizational analysis (Simon, 
1948; March and Simon, 1958), his work is easily seen as exemplary by an 
economist taken up with firm organization. However, although Simon in his more 
methodologically oriented papers directed at economists (Simon, 1976, 1978, 1979) 
typically illustrate BR by means of examples drawn from firms, these examples are 
typically very broad (e.g., centralization vs decentralization, maximizing decisions 
vs rules of thumb) and taken from the works of other contributors or from the 
works of, for example, Cyert and March (1963).  What he tells economists about 
bounded rationality is typically much less specific and elaborated than when he 
tells scholars in psychology or artificial intelligence about the same subject.5  
 In general terms, the BR “research program” may be understood as an 
attempt to elaborate and examine the insights that 1) the human capacity to process 
information is quite limited, 2) humans try to economize on cognitive effort by 
relying on short-cuts, and 3) because of 1) and 2), as well as other factors, such as 
the influence of emotions on cognition, human cognition and judgment is subject to 
a wide range of biases and errors.  Now, Simon’s Grand Theme concerned 1) and 
2); as far as I know, he never took much of an interest in, for example, the biases 
literature of Tversky, Kahneman, Thaler, etc.  Going from 1) to 3) is a story of 
making the ideal type “boundedly rational man” less anonymous (in the sense of 
Schütz, 1932). Thus, the limited capacity information processor (or the adaptive 
problem-solvers discussed in Newell and Simon 1972) is a more anonymous ideal 
type than the agent who comes equipped with reference level biases, adaptive 
preferences and the like. Now, economists of organization have taken an interest in 
1), have been less occupied with 2), and have almost entirely neglected 3). In 
contrast, other economists who have taken an interest in BR has not been burdened 
(if that is the right word) by a commitment to Simon to the same extent as 
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economists of organization have. Thus, scholars working on behavioral finance, 
law and economics and cost-benefit analysis have actively worked with more 
concrete, less anonymous, models of boundedly rational man, typically drawing on 
the biases to judgment and cognition literature.    
 It may, of course, also be argued that economists of organization have been 
reluctant to work with richer models of BR because of the well-known difficulties 
of aligning BR with the basic machinery of neoclassical microeconomics and game 
theory.  Thus, fundamental notions and modeling principles, such as subjective 
expected utility, common priors, rational expectations/dynamic programming, 
backward induction, etc., are not too easily aligned with fundamental findings of 
cognitive psychology (such as gain-loss asymmetries, role-biased expectations, 
etc.).  Moreover, there is a price to be paid in terms of analytical tractability and 
clarity to the extent that one wishes to factor findings from cognitive psychology 
into economic models.  Hence, the use of watered-down versions of BR in 
organizational economics.  The possible problem with this explanation turns on the 
above observation that other kinds of economists have been much less reluctant to 
work with richer models of BR, notably scholars in behavioral finance and 
behavioral law and economics, and with considerable success (as well as 
controversy). A counter-argument to this may be that organizational economists 
are more committed to fundamental game theoretic modeling principles that are 
known to fly in the face of results from cognitive psychology.  
 
Whither Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization?  
As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere (Foss 2001a), the problem with the 
way economists have used BR so far is a logical one. Indeed, BR does not seem to 
be necessary for the purposes it is put to (e.g., explaining contractual 
incompleteness), since other assumptions (e.g., asymmetric information) may 
accomplish these purposes more elegantly and in keeping with maximizing 
rationality.  It is not sufficient either (at least in the context of contract theory), since 
the way in which BR has traditionally been modeled does not appear to guarantee 
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the inefficient investments results that are so crucial in much modern 
organizational economics (Tirole 1999).    
 There are different ways to react to this.  One is to give up talk of BR 
altogether.  Much of the literature has taken this path already (cf. Hart 1990). 
Another one is to argue that perhaps the rather non-productive use of BR in 
organizational economics so far turn on the specific  extremely modest  
conceptualizations of BR that have been adopted. Thus, it really isn’t a big surprise 
that BR does not produce much of a difference if the conceptualization of BR that 
has been adopted in the first place is close to being indistinguishable from 
maximizing (“substantive”) rationality. This would lead towards consideration of 
richer models of BR and the exploration of their consequences for economic 
organization.  Those with this attitude would point to the fact that cholars in other 
disciplines and sub-disciplines have been able to create exciting research 
programmes based on rich(er) notions of BR.  And they would urge organizational 
economists to address all those ways in which human behavior differ from the 
Savage paradigm, explore the consequences of these for bargaining and contracting 
outcomes, and, in turn, explore the consequences for organizational arrangements 
(cf. also Williamson, 1998; Foss 2001a).   
 There are obviously a great many ways in which this may be done, and 
deciding on which ways may be fruitful is obviously of great importance for a 
budding behavioral economics program in economic organization.   One such way 
(which is already complicated enough) is to  pay more attention to the biases to 
cognition and judgment literature (see Rabin, 1998 for an overview). As Williamson 
(1998) points out, such biases are mitigated to a large extent by organization.  
However, specialization cannot cope with all biases, recourse to additional 
organizational measures is likely to be necessary.  One take on this issue is to think 
of biases  as influencing economic outcomes because they influence bargaining 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).  In such a 
perspective, biases may be viewed as determinants of bargaining outcomes on par 
with asymmetric information, strategic behavior and time preference.  For example, 
as Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) argue, the self-serving bias may drastically 
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narrow the contract zone, and perhaps eliminate it altogether.  Another approach 
may be to more concerned with the role of emotions in determining bargaining 
outcomes (Carmichael and McLeod 1997).  A third one may be to link contractual 
incompleteness and search behavior. Etc.   
 Pursuing such a program may, in addition to the difficulties of formalizing 
cognitive psychology, seem to be opening the door to wholesale arbitrariness.  
However, the program is in keeping with a basic Simonian outlook: Search for 
robust generalizations about human behavior and cognition and factor these into 
economic analysis as important assumptions.  My prediction is that an increasing 
number of organizational economists are likely to adopt such a research strategy as 
they find ways to cope with the accompanying modeling difficulties.  
 
Conclusion 
My argument in this brief note has been that although Simon developed the Grand 
Theme of bounded rationality, he did not describe a precise program for pursuing 
research in how BR affects economic organization.  This is perhaps one of the 
reasons why BR is treated in a sort of background manner in most of the economics 
of organization.  Another one is that richer models of BR may be hard to align with 
the basic modeling principles that are routinely applied in modern organizational 
economics.  It is doubtful whether the present half-way house between substantive 
and bounded rationality is a viable research strategy in the long run.  The 
conjecture here is that we are likely to witness a bifurcation of research in 
organizational economics in the near future, with one strand taking the full 
substantive rationality path, and another one taking a behavioral economics path 
that takes much more account of all sorts of insights from cognitive psychology 
than has hitherto been the case. 
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